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Of all the mental phenanena, exhibited by the human mjnd, none seems to offer
mo~ of a challenge to AI modelljng than conscjousness. So much so that it is
ra~ly d jscussed (I would say unconsc jously avoided) jn AI. Th is pape r
add~sses the question "Can AI shed ljght on the phenanena of conscjousness?".
The question can be fruitfully djvjded into two subquestions.
a)Can AI modelling help us to understand the role of consciousness
cognition?
in
(b)Could we build a canputer program which experienced the sensation of
consciousness?
My personal answers to these questions are:
(a)Almost certainly yes, in fact, progress has already been made, and
this paper is a contribution to that debate.
(b)This is the classic problem of 'other minds' in a new guise. We
might answe r answe r (a) to most pe oples sat isfaction, and this might
enable us to build a machine which behaves as if it were
consciousness. Whether we will then be happy to attribute
consciousness to it, and whether we will better understand the
subjective experience of consciousness are open questions. We will
not address this question further in this paper.
One piece of AI evjdence which we will bring to the study of consciousness is
sane work on the guidjng of mathematical proofs using a technique called
meta-level inference, which has been developed by the author and his
co-workers. The AI problem, for which meta-level inference is an attempted
solution, is the canbinatorial explosion. This arises in the modelling of
mathematical reasoning when several rules can be applied to a goal to produce
subgoals. Several rules then apply to each of these subgoals, and the number
f subgoals rises exponentially (or worse) with the depth of the proof. Even
modem electronic canputers cannot cope with the storage overload that this
rapid growth produces, with the consequence that only smple theorems can be
proved automatically by exhaustive search.
In orner to prove mo~ inte~sting theorems, it is necessazy to guide the
search for a proof, so that the only rules appljed to goals a~ those with a
high probability of being in the proof. In meta-level infe~nce this guidance
2infonnation is foDnaljsed as an axiomatic meta-theory. This meta-theory
describes the representation of the original (or object-level) theory.
Inference in the meta-theory induces an implicit inference process in the
object-level theory. This technique has been used by the author and his
co-worl<:ers in the danains of equation solving [Bundy and Welham 81], progran
verfification [Bundy and Sterling 81] and physics [Bundy, Byrd and Mellish 82J.
We will investigate the relation between meta-level inference and
consciousness.
In folk psychology, the teIDIs: conscjous, self-aware and rntrospectjon are
all mtertwined. One consequence of the djscussjon below will be to suggest
that these concepts should be djsentangled. In order to infer the
contradjctjon which will force this disentanglement, let us identjfy
consciousness and self-awareness, and regard introspection as the mechanisn ofboth.
But if introspection is the mechanism of consciousness then, far fran bejng a
ham problem, modellmg conscjousness should be one of the easjest. The
obstacle to progress in most areas of AI is that the processes we are trying to
~odel are carried out at an unconscjous level and are therefore unavailable to
study by introspection. This explains why we have made such good relative
progress in, say, chess canpared with, say, vjsion -the processes mvolved in
playing chess are much more accessible. But conscjousness js, by definition
avajlable to introspection. It should be easy for us to say what conscjousness
consjsts of. Why has this not been done already?
Several people [Slanan 78, Minsky 68J jn the AI ljterature have suggested
that one role of conscjousness is in solvjng the canbinatorial explosjon. This
arises, not only in mathemat ically theorem praY jng, but whenever- a task
involves non-trivjal inference. The argument is that control of search demands
self-awareness of the goals and rules of the problem space and how these fjt
together, i.e. meta-level knowledge. Introspection is a meta-level inference
process where the conscious agent infers which means to apply to achieveparticular 
ends.
At first sight this seems to fit very well with my research, described above,
where control of search is effected by meta-level inference. But this should
have made my research considerably easier than it in fact was. The meta-level
inference steps were not discovered simply by introspecting while solving
-luations, etc. In fact, considerable study, hypothesising, rationalization,
and experimentation went into the design of the programs. It was a trial and
error process.
So if introspection does not consist of meta-level inference, what does it
consist of? We can all conduct the experment of introspecting while thinking,
to see what seems to be going on. The results of my own experments are:
3-It is much haroer than I at first thought, due to the interference
between thinking and thinking about thinking.
-Much, but not all, of the process is conducted in English. I often
imagjne myself arguing with sane fictitious person or canposing an
essay.
-Scmetimes I catch myself thinking of a concept, but not havjng the
Engljsh word for it. So not all my conscious processes are in
English. Scme consist of vjsual concepts (jmagery).
-Only rarely do my conscious processes consist of making control
(search) decisions, i.e. only when such decisions are particularly
tough. Nomally, they consist of 'output' rather than 'traces',
'proofs' rather than 'searches'.
-Using the ideas of my research projects, I would say that
introspective processes are at the object rather than meta level,
except when a control decision is particularly tough, when the whole
show shifts up a level, the meta-level becanes conscious but the
meta-meta-level which decides the issue is still hidden.
An analogy for the relationship between conscious and unconscjous processmg,
which is often offered franComputer Scjence, is that between canpiled and
mterpreted code. Like unconscjous processes, canpiled code nms faster, but
is more difficult to trace than mterpreted code. Programmers often use
mterpreted code, when developing a program, because it is easier to trace,
debug and modjfy. They then canpile it when it is running satisfactorjally.
Similarly, when we are learning a new skill (riding a bjke, walking etc.) we
are conscjous of every move we make, we can easily modjfy what we are doing,
try out new jdeas etc., but we are very slow. When we are satisfied with our
perf 0 III1ance , the procedure becanes unconscjous (automatic, a habit) and much
faster and effortless. However, if our procedure contams bugs they are now
extremely difficult to remove (breaking bad habits). The procedure must be
brought back to consciousness, relearnt and constantly practiced. We seem to
have djfficulty remembering to use the new conscious procedure, instead of the
old unconscious one and so must pay constant attention if we are not to fall
back mto old habits.
Note that Computer Science provides us with a whole range of different levels
of canpilation, fran 'hardwiring' at one extreme to Sussman's 'careful mode' at
.le othe r. We may well want to make use of this diversity to enrich the
conscious/unconscious dichotomy to account for subconscious, hardwired and
other levels of mental process.
The mpljcation of this analogy for control decisjons is that for the most
part they are made by procedures long learnt and canpiled away. There must be
some general purpose ones for dealjng with new situations and they must often
be wrong. The reasons why we do the things we do will usually be obscure and
4Learning to do things djffe~ntly will be fairly traumatic, but
there is a mechanisn for making sane of the unconscious
processes to the fo~, even if we need help with the mo~ deep
questionable.
poBsjble, so
decjsion-making
seated ones.
Note that the degree of canpiledness of the meta-level can be djfferent fran
that of the object-level. Thus we can pay attention to the correctness rules
of algebra without paying attention to the approriateness of their appljcation,
and vjce versa.
What conclusion can we draw fraIl the above? The analogy of interpreted
versus canpiled canputation seems a fruitful one to apply to the djstinctjon
between conscjous and unconscjous processing. The analogy of meta-level
inference seems a fruitful one to apply to self-awareness, but not to
introspection. It seems we must tease apart the concepts of self-awareness and
introspection. The analogy of interpreted/canpiled code suggests a refjnement
of the dichotomy between conscious and unconscjous processing to include
several levels. Overall the analogies fraIl AI/CS suggest a rewoIking and
refinement of the simple teImjnology that we inherit fran folk psychology.
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